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1. Introduction  
When policy makers try to regulate the behaviour of economic agents, one can expect 
those affected by the policy to behave opportunistically.  The modern economic literature 
offers many examples of unanticipated responses to policy activism and policy induced 
opportunistic behaviour1.  In fact, even the pioneers of economics were aware of this 
phenomenon.  Adam Smith (1790) described the problem allegorically: 
 
 “[The man of system] seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a 
great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-
board;… but…, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a 
principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislator might 
choose to impress upon it.” 2.     
 
In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent different tax systems diverge in 
their propensity to create distortionary opportunistic behaviour. More specifically, we 
compare uniform and differentiated tax regimes in terms of vulnerability to strategic 
behaviour by the firms that are targeted by the taxes.  To our knowledge, this issue has 
hitherto largely been neglected in spite of the fact that its policy implications are far from 
trivial.  Our analysis seeks to close this gap in the literature.  We make a case for tax 
uniformity as a policy commitment device for counteracting firms’ opportunistic 
behaviour.  One might naturally conjecture that this argument requires an assumption that 
the government does not intend simply to maximise welfare but is a political support 
maximiser, influenced by lobbying of powerful interest groups 3.  This is, however, not 
the case.  To show that our argument is more generally valid, we model the government 
as a benevolent welfare maximiser.  
 
                                                 
1 One example among many is given in Rodrik (1987).  He argues that, even when a policy is fully 
successful in correcting the distortion it was aimed at, it can create a secondary distortion elsewhere.  In his 
framework, the distortion arises because the government is myopic in setting its policy. 
2 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VI, Section II, Chapter 2. 
3 In the political economy literature, private sector agents engage in “directly unproductive” rent-seeking 
behaviour in order to manipulate governments (see, among many others, Bhagwati (1982) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1994); for a survey on the political economy literature, see Rodrik (1995)).  Farzin and Zhao 
(2003) examine how pollution abatement investment is affected when firms lobby against environmental 
regulation.  Typically and unlike in our paper, the government in such a set-up does not maximise national 
welfare because it is concerned with its political support. 
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The specific set-up in which we carry out our analysis features polluting firms that are 
confronted with a Pigovian emission tax.  Firms can invest in pollution abatement.  We 
start by showing that the existence of emission taxes creates strategic incentives for firms 
to distort their abatement investment.  The cause of the investment distortion lies in the 
fact that the government, as often is the case in the real world, has commitment power in 
the short run but fails to extend that commitment power to the longer run4.  One simple 
reason for this is that governments often are relatively short-lived.  Indeed, Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) argue that constitutional and administrative rules can in fact prohibit long-
term policy commitment, thereby allowing policies to be amended by future 
administrations.  Although governments can commit in the long run by signing up to 
international treaties and investment in infrastructure, other policies including the setting 
of emission taxes typically do not involve any commitment beyond a short horizon. 
 
We subsequently show that the choice of tax regime −a uniform or a differentiated tax 
rate system− makes a substantial difference to firms’ strategic investment behaviour and 
thus to overall welfare.  We argue that, if the possible existence of strategic distortions is 
disregarded, the relative merits of a differentiated tax system will, at its best, be seriously 
overrated and, at its worst, lead to perverse policy recommendations.  Our insights 
therefore contradict the received wisdom that the merits from extra flexibility engendered 
by tailored tax policies must always dominate the straightjacket of a one-size-fits-all 
uniform policy.  Our point is that tax uniformity allows governments to tie their hands in 
order to limit the strategic behaviour of other agents.  Indeed, the government will find 
this commitment device particularly useful when it lacks intertemporal commitment to a 
tax level.  Then, tax uniformity can act as a partial substitute for the long-run 
commitment associated with moving first.  As such, our analysis contributes to the old 
but ongoing debate on the relative merits and drawbacks of differentiated versus uniform 
tax regimes5.   
                                                 
4 This assumption is used in other models, among others by Neary and Leahy (2000) and Zigic (2003).  In 
the environmental economics literature, a similar move order is, for instance, assumed in Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas (1999).    
5 The optimal commodity taxation literature teaches us that the advantage of differentiated taxes is that they 
can be tailored to each commodity’s innate characteristics (see Ramsey (1927); since then, several 
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Although our analysis is carried out in an environmental policy set-up, its message 
stretches well beyond the particulars of this case.  Our choice of this particular 
application is motivated by the fact that environmental regulation is currently a leading 
issue in both local and global policy debates.  In particular, a lot of effort is being 
undertaken in collecting firm-specific information regarding pollution as a means to 
design more flexible –in other words, more differentiated− environmental policy6.  While 
detailed reliable information on firms’ activities makes a system of differentiated taxes 
undoubtedly more feasible, our analysis suggests that the strong propensity of such a tax 
system to engender strategic behaviour by firms also works towards making it less 
socially desirable. 
 
The analysis leading to our main result is developed in sections 2 and 3.  Section 2 
outlines the basic general model and determines the optimal differentiated taxes and 
uniform emission tax, as well as firms’ investment decisions under the alternative tax 
systems.  Section 3 examines the welfare implications of our findings.  In section 4, we 
show how a differentiated tax system can yield outcomes that are, from a social 
perspective, as bad as those that arise when firms collude in setting their investment 
levels.  Section 5 extends the analysis and investigates the robustness of our result.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
Consider an economy with n polluting industries.  For simplicity, we assume initially that 
each industry consists of a single firm and that these monopolist firms export all their 
output. The assumption that all output is exported allows us to ignore consumer interests.  
Also, by reducing the number of distortions in the model to just one, caused by the 
negative pollution externality, it serves the purpose of allowing us to isolate the strategic 
                                                                                                                                                 
modifications of the original Ramsey rule have been proposed, for instance, Diamond (1975) and, more 
recently, Holcombe (2002)).  In an environmental economics context, Lee (1975) shows that differentiated 
emission taxes are superior to a uniform emission tax when monopolist firms have different degrees of 
market power.  However, a practical drawback of differentiated taxes is that they can be both difficult and 
costly to implement. 
6 For instance, Frisvold (2000) states that current trends in the collection of environment-related farm-level 
data can help in the design of more flexible environmental regulation.  
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interaction between firms and the government in a clean way.  We also assume initially 
that firms are symmetric.  Obviously, the well known advantages of tax differentiation in 
terms of tailoring tax rates to individual firms are best shown (and indeed have been 
shown in many set-ups) in a framework with asymmetric firms.    Abstracting from firm 
and industry differences and thus from some of the well understood arguments for non-
uniform taxes, our symmetry assumption allows us to focus more clearly on tax 
uniformity as a commitment device to restrain opportunistic behaviour7. With firm 
symmetry, one would expect that it would not make any difference whether the 
government were to use differentiated tax rates or a uniform tax.  We show that it does 
make a difference.  It is important to stress that our results do not hinge on the 
assumption of symmetry.  Indeed, as we show in section 5, our analysis can easily be 
extended to asymmetric firms and more complex set-ups without changing our qualitative 
results8.   
 
Firm i’s output is denoted by iq  and ip  stands for the price at which the product is sold.  
Demand for good i is given by: 
)( iii qpp =           (1) 
with 0'<ip .  As a by-product of its goods production, each firm generates pollution 
which can be reduced by investment in emission-reducing technology, denoted by ik .  
The level of pollutant emissions, ie , is given by: 
),( iiii kqee =           (2) 
with 0>iqie , 0<ik ie  and 0≥i kk iie .  Here and henceforth, subscripts denote partial 
derivatives.  For now, we assume 0=i kq iie 9, but this assumption is relaxed in Appendix 
B.  
                                                 
7 Obviously, in an environment with asymmetric firms and industries the government needs to choose a 
policy that correctly takes account of these two counteracting effects. 
8 In section 5 we allow for asymmetric firms (see section 5.1), we relax the assumption that all production 
is exported, thereby enhancing the welfare function with consumer surplus (see section 5.2) and we allow 
for multiple firms within an industry (see section 5.3). 
9 Since the assumption of additive separability in the emission function considerably simplifies the analysis, 
it is commonly used, for instance, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), Bruneau (2005), David and 
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Firm i’s costs are given by: 
)()( iiii kqC Γ+          (3) 
with 0>iqiC  and 0>Γ ik i . 
 
The government aims to limit pollution by imposing a tax on emissions.  It has a choice 
between setting a uniform emission tax (t), which is the same across industries, or setting 
a differentiated emission tax ( it ), which is industry specific.  In either case, when 
determining the tax rate, the government maximises welfare (W), defined by: 
∑ +−=
i
iii TDW }{π         (4) 
The first component of the welfare function is profit; iπ  denotes monopolist profits in 
industry i, with 
iiiiiiii TkqCqR −Γ−−= )()()(π        (5) 
where )()( iiiii qpqqR =  denotes firm i’s revenues.  iT  is the amount of emission taxes 
paid by firm i, with iii etT =  when taxes are differentiated and ii teT =  under a uniform 
tax regime.  Thus, in expression (4), ∑
i
iT  represents the government’s tax revenues.  
We further assume that the firm’s gross cost function (i.e., tax inclusive costs) is convex 
in ik ( 0>+Γ i kki kk iiii T ).  iD  stands for the damage caused by industry i’s emission of 
pollutants: 
)( iii eDD =           (6) 
with 0'>iD  and 0'' >iD .   
 
Firms and the government play a three-stage game.  The government has commitment 
power in the short run but cannot extend that commitment power to the longer run.    
While a firm’s output choice is a short-run decision and hence tend to have little 
commitment value, a firm’s investment is typically a long-run decision and entails, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) and Lahiri and Ono (2007), among many others.  However, as we show in 
Appendix B, the main message of the paper will be preserved without the additive separability assumption.  
 6
because of its irreversibility10, a great deal of commitment value.  Thus, in our model 
firms make their long-run investment decisions in the first stage, the government –able to 
influence short-run decisions only− sets its emission tax in the second stage, and firms 
choose output levels, which have very little commitment value, in the final stage11. 
 
Using backward induction, we first turn to the final stage (section 2.1).  Subsequently, we 
determine the optimal emission tax, when the government sets a differentiated and a 
uniform emission tax, respectively (section 2.2).  Finally, we derive firms’ investment 
levels under the alternative tax regimes (section 2.3).  We will show that, in spite of the 
fact that firms are symmetric and hence the expressions for the optimal differentiated and 
the optimal uniform tax rate are the same, firms’ investment levels differ.  Since the latter 
determine the actual level of the tax rate, the actual optimal tax rate under the two tax 
systems will differ. 
 
2.1. Output 
In stage three, each monopolist firm maximises profits with respect to output, implying 
0=iqiπ .  Hence, we obtain the following condition for firm i’s optimal output: 
i
q
ii
q
i
q iii etCR +=          (7) 
Since this stage of the game is the same under both tax systems, substituting it  for t 
yields the corresponding expressions under the uniform tax system. 
 
We differentiate expression (7) with respect to the tax rate and obtain:   
i
qq
i
tq
ii
iiiidtdq ππ // −=          (8) 
with 0<i qq iiπ , guaranteeing that second-order conditions hold.  Since 0<−= iqi tq iii eπ , we 
have 0/ <ii dtdq : faced with an increase in the −differentiated or uniform− emission tax, 
firm i  will cut back production. 
 
                                                 
10 As argued by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), irreversibility is one of the key features of investment. 
11 Neary and Leahy (2000) argue that this is a plausible move order in games between firms and the 
government, the sequence of moves is dictated by the relative commitment power of players’ actions.   
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2.2. The optimal tax rate 
We first derive the optimal tax rate when taxes are differentiated.  Subsequently, we 
calculate the optimal uniform emission tax. 
 
2.2.1. The optimal differentiated emission tax 
The government maximises W with respect to it , taking into account how it  will affect 
firm i’s output.  The first-order condition is given by: 
0=+= i
i
qti dt
dqWW
dt
dW
ii         (9) 
with 0=+= iitt eW ii π , iqiiq ii etDW )'( +−=  (since 0=iqiπ  from stage three) and ii dtdq /  
given by expression (8).  Rearranging terms and simplifying, expression (9) reduces to: 
'ii Dt =           (10) 
Thus, the optimal industry specific tax rate is fully determined by the marginal damage 
that will be caused by firm i’s emissions. 
 
Importantly, because the tax rate is set after firms choose investment levels, each firm 
can influence the tax rate imposed on its industry.  More specifically, we have: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += i
i
i
q
i
k
i
i
i
dk
dqeeD
dk
dt
ii''         (11) 
where ∆−= /''/ ikiqiii ii eeDdkdq  with 2)('' iqii qq iii eD+−≡∆ π  (from the total 
differentiation of 0=iqiπ  with respect to ik  and using expression (11)).  Since 0>∆ , we 
have 0/ >ii dkdq .  The first term between brackets in expression (11) is the direct effect 
of abatement investment on emissions, which is negative, while the second term 
represents the indirect effect of abatement investment through output, which is positive.  
So, at first sight, whether or not firms can use abatement investment to lower the tax rate 
appears to be ambiguous.  However, making use of the expression for ii dkdq / , 
expression (11) simplifies to: 
i
qq
i
k
i
i
i
iiie
D
dk
dt π∆−=
''          (12)  
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It is clear from expression (12) that ii dkdt /  is unambiguously negative, implying that a 
firm’s abatement investment lowers its emission tax rate.  So, firms can use ik  
strategically to lower the tax rate. 
 
2.2.2. The optimal uniform emission tax  
When setting a uniform emission tax, the government maximises welfare with respect to 
t, taking into account that firms’ output levels in all industries will be affected: 
0=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= ∑
i
i
qt dt
dqWW
dt
dW
i          (13) 
with ∑ =+=
i
ii
tt eW 0)(π and iqiq ii etDW )'( +−= .  Hence, the optimal uniform emission 
tax is: 
∑
∑
=
i
ii
q
i
ii
q
i
dtdqe
dtdqeD
t
i
i
)]/([
)]/('[
        (14) 
With symmetry, expression (14) reduces to 'iDt = , which is identical to the expression 
for the optimal differentiated tax12.  Formally: 
 
Proposition 1: With symmetric firms, the optimal emission tax rate is equal to the 
marginal damage of emissions, both under a uniform and under a differentiated tax 
system. 
 
Importantly, expression (14) also shows that, unlike in the case of a differentiated tax, the 
optimal uniform emission tax will be influenced by firms’ investment in all industries.  
The effect of an individual firm’s investment on the tax rate is now: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ∑ ikn
j
i
j
j
q
i
i ij edk
dqe
n
D
dk
dt ''         (15) 
As shown in Appendix A, expression (15) reduces to: 
                                                 
12 Our result here differs from Barnett (1980) since we assume all output is exported, implying that there is 
no domestic consumer surplus.  The presence of domestic consumer surplus will lower the optimal 
emission tax.  We discuss this in an extension of the basic model (see section 4). 
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i
qq
i
k
i
i iiien
D
dk
dt π∆−=
''          (16) 
It is clear from expression (16) that the tax rate falls by a smaller amount in firm i’s 
investment as the number of industries increases.  Furthermore, given the same values of 
iq  and ik  in expressions, a comparison of expressions (12) and (16) informs us that 
)/)(/1(/ iii dkdtndkdt =  for 1>n .  Thus, for 1>n  the impact of a firm’s investment on 
the uniform emission tax is always smaller than in the case with a differentiated tax.  As 
the number of industries subject to the emission tax increases, the effect of any one firm’s 
abatement investment on the emission tax becomes smaller, reducing to zero as ∞→n .   
 
2.3. Investment 
Firms choose investment levels in the first stage of the game.  In doing so, they will 
influence the actual tax rate.  We first derive firms’ investment levels under the non-
strategic benchmark.  Subsequently, we derive investment levels when firms will choose 
abatement investment strategically, under a differentiated and a uniform emission tax 
regime, respectively. 
 
2.3.1. The non-strategic investment benchmark 
Before discussing the strategic term, it proves useful to take a closer look at the case in 
which firms are not able to act strategically; that is, the case in which monopolist firms in 
each industry choose capital levels at the same time as the government determines its tax.  
Firm i’s respective first-order conditions for abatement investment under a differentiated 
and uniform tax system are then given by: 
0=−Γ−= ikiikik iii etπ          (17a) 
and 
0=−Γ−= ikikik iii teπ          (17b) 
With symmetric firms, the government’s respective first-order conditions for the optimal 
tax rate under a differentiated and a uniform tax regime are: 
'ii Dt =           (18a) 
and 
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'iDt =           (18b) 
Firm i’s output is given by expression (7).  Given iq  and ik , expressions (18a) and (18b) 
imply tt i = .  It then follows from expressions (17a) and (17b) that the non-strategic 
abatement investment level under differentiated taxes is identical to the one under a 
uniform tax; in fact, the non-strategic abatement under both tax regimes is equal to the 
firm’s cost-minimising investment level, denoted by iNk .    
 
The non-strategic equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1, which depicts the case with 
differentiated tax rate setting (the case with the uniform tax setting can be similarly 
represented). In the diagram,  )( ii kt  is the government’s tax reaction function to the 
symmetric-firm investment level (given by expression (18a)). From our earlier 
discussion, we know that the government’s reaction function is negatively sloped 
( 0/ <ii dkdt ).  Figure 1 also shows firm i’s investment reaction function to the emission 
tax, )( ii tk  (given by expression (17a)). The slope of firm i’s reaction function is given by 
i
kk
i
tk
ii
iiiidtdk ππ // −= .  Since  0<i kk iiπ  and with 0>−= iki tk iii eπ , )( ii tk  is positively 
sloped.  Also, when the emission tax is zero, the firm has no incentive to invest in 
abatement (thus, its reaction function starts out of the origin). The non-strategic 
equilibrium, characterised by the firm’s cost-minimising investment level iNk  and the 
government’s tax rate iNt , is indicated by N, the intersection of the reaction functions. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.3.2. Strategic investment under a differentiated emission tax 
Each firm maximises its profits with respect to ik , taking into account how its capital 
investment will affect the industry’s emission tax ( ii dkdt / ): 
0=+= i
i
i
t
i
ki
i
dk
dt
dk
d
ii πππ         (19) 
The first term in expression (19) is the direct marginal effect of ik  on total −that is, tax 
inclusive− costs ( ikiikik iii et−Γ−=π ).  The second term in expression (19) represents firm 
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i’s strategic incentive to manipulate the emission tax.  Since the emission tax lowers firm 
profit ( 0<it iπ ) and abatement investment lowers the tax rate ( 0/ <ii dkdt ), the strategic 
term in expression (7) is positive.  Hence, the direct effect (the first term in expression 
(7)) has to be negative ( 0<ik iπ ).  Given the assumption made earlier that the firm’s tax 
inclusive costs are convex in ik ( 0>+Γ i kki kk iiii T ), it follows that firm i overinvests 
relative to the cost minimising non-strategic benchmark in order to lower the emission 
tax13.  
 
In terms of the diagram in Figure 1, firm i picks the point of the government’s reaction 
function that is associated with the highest profit.  This point is indicated by D, the 
tangency point of isoprofit contour Dπ  to the government’s reaction function, which 
entails a different emission tax rate than the non-strategic benchmark ( iNiD tt ≠ ).   
 
2.3.3. Strategic investment under a uniform emission tax  
With a uniform tax system in place, firm i’s first-order condition for choosing capital in 
stage one is given by:  
 0=+= iitiki
i
dk
dt
dk
d
i πππ         (20) 
Like with differentiated emission taxes, the strategic term is positive since 0<itπ  and 
0/ <idkdt .  So, the firm here too overinvests relative to the non-strategic benchmark. 
 
Proposition 2: When firms set their abatement investment before the government 
chooses its abatement tax, they over-invest relative to the non-strategic cost-minimising 
abatement investment level, both under a uniform and under a differentiated tax system. 
 
From a comparison of the formulas for ii dkdt /  in (12) and idkdt /  in (16), one could 
say that the incentive for strategic overinvestment is larger in the differentiated tax 
regime than in the uniform tax regime.  However, because we have general functional 
                                                 
13 This terminology is commonly used in the literature on strategic investment (see, for instance, Tirole, 
1988). 
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forms, one should not prematurely conclude from this that the level of investment is 
higher in the differentiated tax regime than in the uniform tax regime.  In the next section, 
we formally show that this intuition is correct, subject to some mild regularity 
assumptions. 
 
Note that, with differentiated taxes, firms’ capital levels are strategically independent.  
However, with a uniform tax, even though firms do not compete in the product markets, 
firms’ capital variables are interdependent.  At the symmetric equilibrium, they typically 
are strategic substitutes: firm i’s abatement investment lowers the uniform emission tax, 
thereby reducing other firms’ incentives to invest in abatement.  
 
3. Welfare 
In this section, we explore how the alternative tax systems perform from a social point of 
view.  It is therefore useful to examine the first-best and subsequently compare the 
performance of the alternative tax systems to the socially optimal benchmark. 
 
3.1. The first best 
We derive the first-best benchmark by deriving the output and abatement investment 
levels (which together determine emissions) a social planner would choose.  We can 
rewrite expression (4) as 
∑ −Γ−−=
i
iiiiiiiiii kqeDkqCqRW ))],(()()()([      (21) 
The first-order condition for the socially optimal iq  is: 
0' =−− iqiiqiq iii eDCR         (22a) 
while the first-order condition for the socially optimal level in abatement investment is: 
0' =−Γ− ikiik ii eD          (22b) 
A comparison of expressions (22a) and (7) tells us that firm i will produce the socially 
optimal output level provided that 'ii Dt =  under a differentiated tax system and, given 
symmetry, 'iDt =  under a uniform tax regime.  Since we have shown that, even if firms 
choose abatement investment before the emission tax is set, 'ii Dt = , in both tax systems 
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output is in fact optimally chosen, given the investment level.  However, given 'ii Dt = , 
it is clear from a comparison of expression (22b) to expressions (19) and (20) 
respectively, that under neither of the two tax regimes do firms choose the socially 
optimal level of abatement investment.   In fact, the first-best investment level is actually 
the abatement that minimises costs ( 0=−Γ−= ikiikik iii etπ ), which firms would choose 
only if they were unable to act strategically (see expressions (17a) and (17b)). 
 
3.2. Tax uniformity versus tax differentiation: A social ranking 
We now wish to derive the social ranking of the alternative tax systems. Due to 
symmetry, the government always chooses the taxes optimally given the investment 
levels set by the firm (that is to say the government cannot do better by differentiating its 
tax.) However, as we have seen, investment levels depend on the tax regime.   
As a preliminary to deriving a social ranking of the alternative tax systems, we compare 
the abatement level that would be chosen by a social planner and the levels of abatement 
investment in the alternative tax regimes. 
 
 
Define κ as a symmetric level of k and ω(κ) as the level of welfare as a function of κ. 
From our earlier analysis we know that the level of κ that maximises this function is the 
cost-minimising investment level Nκ , where  iNN k=κ  for all i. To compare investment 
levels in the different tax regimes without imposing special functional forms, we impose, 
here and henceforth, a mild regularity assumption.  
 
Assumption 1: Assume (i) that the profit function of the typical firm in the 
differentiated tax case is concave in investment in the region of investment that includes 
iNiUiD kkk ,, and (ii) thatω(κ) is concave in investment in the region of investment that 
includes NUD κκκ ,,  
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Proposition 3: For ∞<< n1 , the symmetric investment level under the differentiated 
tax system is higher than the one under the uniform tax regime, which in turn is higher 
than the non-strategic cost-minimising abatement investment level ( iNiUiD kkk >> ). 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Given that the only distortion under the two tax regimes occurs in abatement investment 
and given the difference in abatement investment levels under the alternative tax regimes, 
we are now able to give a social ranking of the two tax regimes relative to the first-best. 
   
Proposition 4: With symmetric firms, the welfare level under a uniform emission tax 
system exceeds the welfare level under a differentiated emission tax system. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
 
Figure 2 shows the welfare gap between the first-best and the alternative emission tax 
regimes, depicted as a function of the number of industries.  The welfare level attained 
under a differentiated tax system is independent of the number of industries since the 
capital level remains unaffected by the latter.  Hence, the welfare gap with the first-best is 
constant in n.  Under the uniform tax system, the welfare gap with the first-best decreases 
in n and vanishes in the limit when ∞→n . 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4.  Strategic behaviour and collusion 
In our model, firms choose pollution abatement non-cooperatively.  In this section, we 
compare the social performance of a differentiated and a uniform tax system when firms 
collude to strategically manipulate the government.  While it is well known that collusion 
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between firms often has negative welfare effects14, the same negative welfare effects are 
typically not attributed to a differentiated tax system.  We show here that, in fact, a 
differentiated tax system is, from a social point of view, equally harmful as allowing 
firms that are behaving strategically to collude when choosing their investments.     
 
Clearly, when the government sets differentiated taxes, the firms are playing 
independently against the government and so cannot gain anything from coordinating 
their investment levels. However, when the tax is uniform, each firm ignores the 
beneficial effect of its strategic behaviour on other firms. From the firms’ viewpoint, 
there is a free-riding problem with respect to strategic behaviour. From a social point of 
view, this is a good thing as it reduces a firm’s incentive to overinvest in abatement, 
which limits the strategic distortion.  However, when firms collude in investment, they 
internalise the free-rider problem, which leaves them in a stronger position to manipulate 
government policy and will therefore give them a stronger incentive to invest 
strategically.  Formally, when firms cooperate in pollution abatement, they choose 
investment levels by maximising joint profits with respect to ik .  Let ∑=Π
i
iπ .  The 
first-order condition for the cooperatively chosen investment levels is given by: 
i
dk
dt
dk
d
itki i ∀=Π+Π=
Π                       0       (23) 
We have ikk ii π=Π  (since 0=jk iπ  for ij ≠ ) and itt nπ=Π  under symmetry, while 
idkdt /  is given by expression (16).  Thus, expression (23) reduces to 
0)/''( =∆− iki qqiitik iiii eD πππ .  This is identical to the expression for the firm’s investment 
choice under the differentiated tax system (expression (19) with ii dkdt /  substituted by 
expression (12)).  In fact, if firms, facing a uniform tax, are able to act as if they were a 
single firm, they will choose the same investment level as firms under a differentiated tax 
regime, which implies that actual tax rate would be the same too.  Or, put differently, a 
system of differentiated taxes effectively mimics investment collusion under the uniform 
                                                 
14 Of course, we focus here only on the negative aspects of investment cooperation. Investment joint 
ventures could also involve information or cost sharing or other synergies that result in an increase in social 
efficiency. 
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tax system and has therefore the same negative welfare implications as investment 
collusion.  Summarising: 
 
Proposition 5: With symmetric firms, if firms, facing a uniform emission tax, collude in 
abatement investment, investment levels, the actual emission tax rate and hence the 
welfare level are the same as under differentiated tax rates. 
 
Showing that tax differentiation yields the same outcome as collusive behaviour under a 
uniform tax illustrates rather vividly how harmful the differentiated tax regime can be.   
 
5.  Extensions 
 
In this section, we will briefly discuss a few extensions of the basic model.  In turn, we 
will allow for asymmetric firms, a welfare function that includes consumer surplus and 
oligopolistic industries. 
 
5.1. Asymmetric firms 
 
It is well known that, if firms are asymmetric (for instance, they have different costs or 
different degrees of market power15), differentiated emission tax rates have –unlike a 
uniform emission tax− the advantage that each firm can have a tax rate imposed on it that 
is tailor made to its emissions  Hence, one has to trade-off this advantage of a 
differentiated tax system against its disadvantage in terms of its propensity to create 
greater strategic distortions, as we have argued, and against the well known 
disadvantages in terms of greater administrative costs. 
 
5.2. Consumer surplus 
In our basic model, we assumed firms’ production was not intended for domestic 
consumption, thus there was no consumer surplus in the welfare function.  Obviously, 
with domestic consumption, the first-best policy would require the use of two types of 
policy instruments: production subsidies to correct the output distortion and Pigovian 
emission taxes to correct the negative externality.  When production subsidies are not 
                                                 
15 See Lee (1975).   
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available, the optimal (second-best) emission tax is smaller than the one derived in 
section 316.  Also, since the strategic investment behaviour to lower the emission tax is 
stronger under a differentiated tax regime than under a uniform tax system, the average 
differentiated emission tax rates tend to be lower than the uniform emission tax.  
Therefore, output and hence consumer surplus will be higher under differentiated 
emission taxes.  Again, when choosing emission tax rates, one will need to trade off the 
disadvantages of differentiated emission tax rates against the advantages, one of which is 
a larger consumer surplus. 
 
5.3. Oligopolistic industries 
Our analysis can be extended in a straightforward way to multiple-firm industries17.  
Suppose that there are m symmetric firms in an industry, engaging in Cournot 
competition.  Then, firm i’s revenues will not only be affected by its own output (as in 
expression (5)), but also by its rivals’ outputs, i.e., ∑
≠
=
m
ijj
jiii qqRR
,
),(  with 0>iqiR  and 
)(  0 ijR i
q j
≠< ; output levels of firms belonging to the same industry are strategic 
substitutes ( 0<i qq jiR ). 
 
We will focus on a single (m-firm) industry as across industries, firms’ behaviour is 
discussed in the basic model.  However, within each industry, firms’ strategic behaviour 
will also depend on whether emission taxes are uniform or firm-specific. 
 
With differentiated (i.e., firm-specific) emission taxes, firms’ face an additional strategic 
incentive under oligopoly that is not present in a monopolistic industry. Under Cournot 
oligopoly, higher rival output has a negative effect on a firm’s profits.  Hence, each firm 
within a particular industry will now, in addition to a strategic incentive to lower its own 
                                                 
16 See Barnett (1980). 
17 There is a number of recent papers addressing environmental policy in an oligopolistic set-up.  Those 
models are mainly concerned with a comparison between emission taxes and standards in oligopoly (see, 
for instance, Van Long and Soubeyran (2001) and Lahiri and Ono (2007)) and do not compare uniform and 
differentiated emission taxes.  Other papers have discussed the effects of environmental policy on market 
structure (see, for instance, Conrad and Wang (1993) and Kohn (1997)). 
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emission tax, also have a strategic incentive to lower its rival’s market share through 
changing the relative tax rates.  Given rival abatement, investment works to lower own 
taxes by more than the rivals’ and thus will benefit the investing firm through increasing 
its market share.  This additional strategic incentive suggests that firm-specific emission 
taxes generate even more severe distortions in abatement investment in oligopolistic than 
in monopolistic industries.   
 
With a uniform emission tax, the strategic incentive to influence its rivals’ output levels 
through manipulation of the relative tax rate is absent.  Therefore, with a uniform 
emission tax, firms’ strategic investment incentives in oligopolistic industries are not any 
different from those in monopolist industries. 
 
This implies that the key result that differentiated emission tax systems have a stronger 
propensity to create strategic distortions in abatement investment than a uniform emission 
tax system holds a fortiori when industries are oligopolistic. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
As a starting point of our analysis, we showed that the very existence of emission taxes 
creates strategic incentives for polluting firms that lead to new distortions.  When the 
long-run commitment power implied by irreversible investment on the part of firms is 
combined with a short-run commitment to emission taxes on the part of the government, 
firms invest strategically in order to manipulate the government’s emission taxes.  This 
strategic incentive distorts firms’ investment. 
 
We found that a system of differentiated emission taxes has a greater propensity to foster 
strategic distortions in abatement investment than a uniform tax regime.  Furthermore, 
under uniform taxation, strategic investment behaviour gets weaker as the number of 
firms subjected to the emission tax increases.  Hence, given sufficient symmetry between 
firms, when firms choose their investment levels before governments set taxes, a system 
of differentiated emission taxation is socially inferior to a uniform tax system.  In fact, we 
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showed that a system of differentiated emission taxes lowers social welfare to the same 
extent as collusion in pollution-abatement investment would. 
 
In spite of its significance and harmfulness, strategic investment behaviour promoted by a 
policy package of differentiated tax rates may be easily overlooked, especially when it 
does not involve any directly unproductive rent-seeking activities, such as lobbying.  
While our analysis was carried out in a set-up with pollution and emission taxation, its 
message about the relative merits of uniform versus differentiated taxation extends far 
beyond the specific framework of our model18.  We therefore argue more generally that, 
apart from a tax policy’s efficiency and administering costs, one should also consider its 
propensity to engender strategic distortions when designing or assessing various tax 
policy packages. 
 
Appendix A 
In expression (14), let ∑ ≡
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j
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dqe
n
D
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dt )1(''        (A.1) 
To derive ii dkdq /  and ij dkdq / , we totally differentiate the first-order conditions for iq  
and jq  and obtain, respectively: 
                                                 
18 One could, for instance, examine the same issue in a setting with positive production externalities and 
Pigovian subsidies.  Prior to the subsidy being set, firms will strategically invest, that is, they will deviate 
from cost minimisation (they will, for instance, strategically overinvest in technologies that reduce 
marginal production costs) in order to raise the actual subsidy, but will do so to a larger extent when 
subsidy rates are differentiated. 
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with 0=j kq ijπ .  Substituting idkdt /  for expression (A.1), we formulate expressions 
(A.2a) and (A.2b) in matrix form: 
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Hence, we have  
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with the determinant of the coefficient matrix in (A.3) denoted by ∇ , which simplifies to 
)''( iq
i
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i
qq
i
qq iiiiii eDπππ +≡∇ when we invoke symmetry.  Using expressions (A.4a) and 
(A.4b), we can write 
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Substituting expression (A.5) into expression (A.1), using symmetry ( jq
i
q ji ee = ) and 
assuming 0=i kq iie  (and hence 0=−= i kqi kq iiii teπ ), we obtain: 
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Appendix B 
Like many papers in the literature we have imposed additive separability on the emission 
function so that 0=i kq iie .  We now consider what difference it makes when we relax this 
assumption. 
Expressions (1)-(10) in the text remain.  Expression (11) also remains valid, but now we 
have ∆−= /)''(/ ikiqii kqii iiii eeDdkdq π  with 0≠−= i kqii kq iiii etπ ; expression (12) is now 
replaced by: 
)('' iq
i
kq
i
k
i
qq
i
i
i
iiiiii ee
D
dk
dt ππ +−∆=         (B.1) 
The first term between brackets in expression (B.1) is negative while the second (new) 
term will be positive if 0>−= i kqii kq iiii etπ .  Then –depending on the relative magnitudes 
of the two terms−, a firm’s investment either lowers or raises its emission tax rate.  
Importantly however, while its sign is ambiguous, ii dkdt /  is unlikely to be zero.  Hence, 
firms can use ik  strategically to alter the differentiated tax rate. 
Expressions (13)-(14) in the text and expressions (A.1)-(A.5) in Appendix A remain 
unaltered.  However, since we now have 0≠−= i kqi kq iiii teπ , substituting expression (A.5) 
into expression (A.1) and using symmetry ( jq
i
q ji ee = ) yields: 
)('' i qq
i
k
i
kq
i
q
i
i iiiiii een
D
dk
dt ππ −∆=        (B.2) 
instead of expression (16).  Hence, regardless of the sign of ii dkdt /  and idkdt / , it 
remains that, like in the case in which 0=i kq iie , )/)(/1(/ iii dkdtndkdt =  for 1>n .  
Expressions (17a)-(23) and the rest of the discussion in the text continue to hold. 
 
Appendix C 
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
In this proposition we compare different symmetric levels of investment κ.  The strategy 
of the proof is as follows. We first compare marginal profits from investment in different 
regimes at a common κ and then, with the use of Assumption 1 (which is a mild regularity 
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assumption), we show that, the ranking of marginal returns to investment corresponds to 
the ranking of symmetric investment levels. 
 
Substitute iit ei −=π into equation (19) to write marginal profits from investment under the 
differentiated tax regime as: i
i
ii
ki
i
dk
dte
dk
d
i −= ππ .   This is a continuous function of the 
level of investment and can be written more compactly as )(κDm with 0)( =DDm κ . We 
will assume (reasonably) that profits in the differentiated tax case are strictly concave in 
ki in the region that includes Nκ , Uκ  and Dκ . Thus, )(κDm  falls in κ  in that region.  
Similarly when we use iit e−=π  in equation (20) we can write the marginal profits from 
investment under the uniform tax regime as: i
ii
ki
i
dk
dte
dk
d
i −= ππ . This function is also 
continuous, depends on the level of investments and can be written more compactly as 
)(κUm  with 0)( =UUm κ . Now compare these marginal returns at a common κ -level. 
0''11)()( ≥∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=− i qqikiii
i
iUD
iie
D
n
e
dk
dt
dk
dtemm πκκ .  Hence, )()( κκ DU mm <  
provided that ∞<< n1 .  We also need to compare the investment levels chosen by the 
firms in the different tax regimes with the non-strategic level. At the non-strategic 
investment level, 0=ik iπ . We can write this as 0)( =NNm κ  and we assume that )(κNm  
is falling in κ  in the relevant region (this is reasonable because, as we show later, 
0=ik iπ  also implies the marginal social return to investment is at the optimal level and 
we assume that the social return to investment is concave in the relevant region). It is 
clear that at common κ -levels both of the bilateral comparisons 
)/()()( iiiND dkdtemm −=− κκ and )()( κκ NU mm − = )/( ii dkdte− are positive. 
 
Summarising: (i) )(κNm  and )(κDm  are monotonically falling in the relevant region; (ii) 
0)( =NNm κ  at Nκ ; 0)( =DDm κ  at Dκ  and 0)( =UUm κ at Uκ ; (iii) at any common κ,  
)()()( κκκ DUN mmm << . 
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Now we can compare levels of κ  in the different equilibria N, D and U. The proof that 
DUN κκκ <<  is immediate.  At Uκ , we have )(0)()( UDUUUN mmm κκκ <=< . 
Furthermore, )(κNm and )(κDm are falling in κ  and are zero only at the respective 
equilibrium levels ( 0)( =NNm κ  and 0)( =DDm κ ), thus UN κκ <  and UD κκ > (see 
Figure 3). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Proof of proposition 4: 
Suppose the social planner was to choose the investment levels, then as we saw in the 
text it would set the investments at the non-strategic level. As we saw in the text, given 
symmetry of the firms we can write the social planner’s objective function as )(κω , 
which from assumption 1 is concave. The derivative of )(κω  is )(κNm , which is falling 
in κ  and the first-order condition for maximisation of )(κω  implies 0)( =NNm κ . Given 
the concavity of )(κω  welfare is falling the further away from Nκ and since 
DUN κκκ <<  (from proposition 3), the welfare level under a uniform emission tax 
system exceeds the welfare level under a differentiated emission tax system. 
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